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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN BRODIE THURMAN, JR.* and ROGER G. WHITE**
INTRODUCTION

The tremendous expansion of the functions of local governmental
agencies, particularly into provinces heretofore reserved for private
enterprise, has resulted in a similar expansion of local government
law. It seems safe to assert that within the confines of local government law can be found legal principles and rules from practically
every other field of law. It is necessary, therefore, to limit the scope
of an annual survey of local government law; no longer is it possible
to include in a survey article such as this a discussion of all of these
legal principles and rules. Nor is such a discussion necessary, since
many of these rules will be treated in other survey articles. Consequently, the present survey article will attempt to emphasize various
aspects of this body of law which would not receive treatment elsewhere in the survey or which would not be expected, as a general rule,
to be discussed in another survey article.'
Although a number of cases involving local government law were
decided by the Tennessee appellate courts during the survey period,
very few involved questions of first impression. Since most of the
rules underlying these decisions were fairly well-settled, there is little
need for extensive background analysis. With relatively few exceptions, therefore, only a brief sketch of the individual cases will be
attempted.
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Qualificationsof Office: In Kinkead v. State2 the Tennessee Supreme
Court defined the phrase, "freeholder of the city,"3 to mean a person
who holds legal title to a common-law freehold estate 4 situated within
the territorial boundaries of the city. Defendant, who had been elected
city commissioner, claimed he was a freeholder and qualified to hold
the office on the following grounds: (1) he resided within the city
Research Assistant, Vanderbilt Law School; Member, Arkansas Bar.
** Chief Editorial Assistant, Race Relations Law Reporter.
*

1. In accordance with this approach, all decisions on tort liability of municipal or public corporations will be left entirely to the survey of tort law.
Administrative law problems, such as municipal licensing of dealers in
intoxicating beverages, will not be treated herein. The survey of a particular
field of law or procedure should be consulted by the reader interested in
cases in that field which also involve points of local government law.
2. 303 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1957).

3. The phrase "freeholder of the city" eminates from the Charter of Johnson
City, § 15, art. 5 (quoted in instant case, 303 S.W.2d at 714-15).
4. 303 S.W.2d at 715, "A 'freehold' is an estate for life or in fee simple. A
freehold estate is equal to, or greater than, a life estate."
1303
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in a home which was owned by his wife; (2) he had made extensive
repairs and had satisfied an encumbrance due on the wife's property;
(3) he operated a business within the city, leasing the premises on a
month-to-month basis; (4) he owned certain real estate in the county,
but not situated within the city limits; and (5) his mother owned
burial lots in a cemetery in the city. The court rejected each of these
grounds, finding that the defendant did not have a vested present
interest in a freehold estate situated in Johnson City.5
Misconduct in Office: The Tennessee personal interest statute makes
it unlawful for an officer of a municipal or public corporation to have
a direct or indirect interest in any contract in which the municipal
or public corporation is interested. 6 Whether a loan of money to a
school district by a bank whose president and principal stockholder
was a member of the school board violated the Personal Interest
Statute was at issue in State v. Yoakum.7 The trial court found that
the loan was made in good faith and solely to accommodate the school
board, but held that the personal interest statute had been violated.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a loan of money made in
good faith for a legitimate purpose at the legal rate of interest was not
within "the policy and purpose of the statute."8 The court distinguished a loan of money from a contract for goods or services, on the
ground that in the latter case a question of value is presented, requiring good faith negotiation without any conflict of interest on the
part of any member of the board, whereas in the case of the loan of
money, the legal rate of interest is less than the legal maximum. D
The court also noted that any other construction of the statute would
result in great inconvenience to small communities and might prevent the school board or other municipal or public corporation from
performing its functions. 10
State ex rel. Chitwood v. Murley" presented the question of whether
5. The defendant's interest in his wife's real property was an inchoate
interest-a mere future expectancy, not a present vested interest-which may
or may not become vested in the defendant on the death of the wife. The
nature of this interest was not affected by the fact that he had made extensive
repairs and had satisfied an encumbrance on the property, for the law presumes that the husband has made a gift to his wife. The business interest was
not sufficient, since defendant was a tenant, not a freeholder. Finally, the
wording of the Charter required that the freehold estate be situated within
the city, and his property interest in the county was, therefore, insufficient.
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-401 (1956). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-402
(1956) (penalty for violation).
7. 306 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
8. Id. at 40.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. "To apply the statutes to such a situation, it seems to us, would be
going beyond their meaning and purpose and result in great inconvenience in
small communities where bank officers and stockholders frequently occupy
positions of public trust and authority."
11. 308 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1957).
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a public officer may be removed from office for misconduct occurring
in a previous term of office. It is well settled in Tennessee that misconduct in a previous term of office will not be grounds for ouster in
a subsequent term under the Ouster Act,2 and that the expiration of
the term will render the question moot, even though the official succeeds himself. 13 In the instant case, however, the proceedings were
brought under the quo warranto provisions of the Code, 14 and it was
contended that the rule in ouster proceedings was not applicable to
quo warranto proceedings. This contention was rejected, however, on
the ground that there was little, if any, substantive difference between
these two types of proceedings. Procedural distinctions were not
deemed sufficient to require different treatment in quo warranto cases.
State ex rel. West v. Kivett'5 is somewhat similar to the preceding
case in that the death of a county judge pending appeal of quo warranto proceedings to remove him from office rendered the issues raised
in the case moot. The judge had been convicted and sentenced to the
penitentiary for embezzlement of county funds, and while an appeal
in the criminal case was pending, the quo warranto proceedings were
instituted under a Code provision vacating the office of any state official sentenced to the penitentiary. 6 The defendant had claimed that
the Code provision was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the
7
constitutional provision providing for impeachment of county judges.'
The court, reviewing the authorities on the effect of the expiration of
the term of office on prior misconduct, held that the death of the
county judge had the same effect, and that there was not sufficient
public interest in the present type of case to allow the court to make
an exception to the rule that it would not decide moot questions. 18
It will be noted that both of the two preceding cases were brought
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2701 (1956).
13. See, e.g., State ex rel. Phillips v. Greer, 170 Tenn. 529, 98 S.W.2d 79
(1936); State ex rel. Wilson v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229, 208 S.W. 607 (1919).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2801 (1956).
15. 308 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. 1957).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2801 (1956) "Any office in this state is vacated:
. (6) By the sentence of the incumbent, by any competent tribunal in this
or any other state, to the penitentiary, subject to restoration if the judgment
is reversed, but not if the incumbent is pardoned."
17. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 6. It was contended that this section of the Constitution provided the exclusive method of removing a county judge from
office. The lower court had rejected this contention on the ground that the
acts of the judge had vacated the office and suit was brought merely to enjoin
him from interfering with the office already vacated by him. See 308 S.W.2d
at 834.
18. The court noted that in several prior cases when the question had become moot a decision had been rendered because the right of a governmental
agency to perform certain duties had been successfully challenged in the trial
court and the duties of the agency would be left in doubt until the supreme
court had decided the question. This was not the case here, however, especially
in view of the fact that the situation would arise only infrequently. See 308
S.W.2d at 836-37.
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before the court by quo warranto proceedings. In State ex rel. Wallen
v. Miller19 the question involved the parties who may bring such proceedings. The proceedings had been instituted by a number of private
citizens, without joining the District Attorney General, to remove the
public officer on the ground that he had violated the public interest
statute.20 The court held that the District Attorney General or the
Attorney General was an indispensable party to the quo warranto proceedings. Moreover, it noted that the private citizens would not have
21
sufficient interest in the case to bring a regular proceeding at law
23
22
and that the Ouster Act was not applicable.
Discharge of Public Employees: In one case the question concerned
not the substantive matters surrounding the discharge of public employees, but the proper appellate court in which to pursue an appeal
from a circuit court judgment quashing the judgment of a mayor removing commissioners of a housing authority from office on the ground
of neglect of duty.2 4 The appeal was presented to the supreme court,
which ordered it transferred to the court of appeals. The circuit court
had heard the matter on a writ of certiorari which did not preclude it
from making findings of fact; therefore, the court of appeals was the
proper appellate court.
Both substantive and procedural matters pertaining to the discharge
of a public school teacher were presented in Johnson v. City of Jackson.25 The teacher had been discharged for cause-namely, mistreating
students-after she had been notified of her re-election to teach in
the succeeding school year2 6 and after the expiration of the prior
school term, and she sought to recover her salary on the ground that
she had been wrongfully discharged. The court first found that the
General Education Bill of 1925 was inapplicable, 27 and that the public
schools of Jackson were operated under a private act2 which gave a
19. 304 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1957).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-401, 402 (1956).

21. 304 S.W.2d at 658.
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2701 (1956).
23. 304 S.W.2d at 659-60. It should be noted that the term had expired in
the present case.
24. Mayor of the City of Jackson v. Thomas, 302 S.W.2d 56 (Tenn. 1957).
25. 302 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).

26. The court held that the letter notifying the teacher of her re-election
was sufficient to create a contract for her services in the succeeding school
year, since the letter requested that the teacher notify the superintendent of
schools if she could not accept. 302 S.W.2d at 359.
27. The reason given by the court is that the statute expressly excluded
schools being operated under private act if the school district levies an addition tax for the operation of its schools. See 302 S.W.2d at 360 (quoting
the exclusion provision of the General Education Bill of 1925). The City
Charter, Tenn. Priv. Acts (1909), c. 407, § 27, provides for this additional tax,
and while the teacher claimed no such tax was actually levied, the court held
that in the absence of proof to the contrary, there is a presumption that the
tax was levied and collected. See 302 S.W.2d at 361.
28. Tenn. Priv. Acts (1915), c. 168.
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commissioner of education the power to discharge any employee for
cause. 29 An appeal from the discharge by the commissioner to the full
Board of School Commissioners was allowed, if brought within three
days of the discharge.30 Since the teacher had failed to appeal within
the allotted time, she had lost her right of appeal. The court further
held that the commissioner could discharge a teacher for cause at
any time.3 1
Removal by Recall: As a general rule, charters and statutes regulating municipal corporations frequently provide for the removal of
elected officials by recall elections.3 2 Such a provision in the charter
of Union City3 3 was before the court in Roberts v. Brown.34 The procedure is substantially the same as that adopted in most other jurisdictions: a petition calling for a recall election and signed by a certain
number of the qualified electors of the city is filed with the city clerk,
who is charged with the duty of examining the petition and determining its legal sufficiency. If sufficient, the clerk certifies the petition to
the county election commission; otherwise, it is returned to the petitioners.
In Roberts v. Brown the clerk refused to certify both original3 5 and
amended petitions.3 6 The petitioners sought and obtained a writ of
certiorari to correct the action of the clerk. Three important questions
were presented; first, whether the writ of certiorari was the proper
appellate remedy; second, whether the recall provision was constitutional; third, whether city officials who received benefits under the
city charter could question its validity.
Certiorari was held to be an appropriate remedy, since the clerk was
acting in a judicial capacity and the writ was sought to regulate,
correct and keep an inferior jurisdiction within its authority. 37 No
29. Id. at § 22.
30. Ibid.

31. Johnson v. City of Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tenn. 1957).
32. See 4 McQuLLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.251 (3d ed. 1949).
33. Tenn. Priv. Acts (1925), c. 760, § 22.
34. 310 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).

35. With regard to the original petition, the clerk allowed a number of the
signers to withdraw their signatures during the ten day period in which she
was to examine the petition. The result was a lack of the requisite number
of signatures. This was clearly improper. 310 S.W.2d at 204, 214; 4 McQUILLAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.251 at 315 (3d ed. 1949).

36. The clerk rejected the amended petitions on a number of grounds, most
of which were purely technical. For example, some petitions were rejected
because the full names of the signers had been inserted in the place of initials.
See 310 S.W.2d at 202-03.
37. The Tennessee Code provides for two types of certiorari-the statutory
equivalent of the common-law writ, TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-801 (1956), and
the so-called statutory writ, TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-802 (1956). It was contended that the petitioners must elect between these two writs, since under
the latter provision, trial de novo may be had, whereas the court under the
former section is limited to the question of whether the inferior jurisdiction
exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally. The court rejected this contention
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other method of review-e.g., appeal or writ of error-was available
here;38 while mandamus would lie, it would not exclude the writ of
certiorari. 39
Recall provisions have generally been upheld as constitutional 4 0
and the Tennessee court, noting the general rule, sustained the recall
provision in the instant case. In the first place, the recall provision did
not conflict with the general law providing for the removal of public
officials, indeed, the charter expressly declared that the recall procedure was cumulative, not exclusive. 41 Moreover, since municipal
corporations are "extensions of the state government itself, they may
be established with such provisions in their charters as to the Legislature may seem right and proper."42 Finally, the home rule amendment to the Tennessee Constitution, 43 prohibiting local legislation
which has the effect of removing an incumbent from office unless
conditioned upon the approval of the local governing body or electorate, was not applicable; the amendment did not affect legislation enacted prior to its adoption, and further, the officer is not removed from
office, but merely subjected to the risk of a new election.
The court also held that even if the constitutionality of the recall
provisions were not sustained, neither the city clerk nor the city
commissioner sought to be recalled could raise the question. Both
were holding office under the charter and had accepted benefits under
its provisions; therefore, both were estopped from denying the validity
of the recall provisions. Once a public official has accepted the benefits conferred upon him by an act, he will not be heard to question
the validity of that act in any particular, for to allow him to do so
would be to allow him to hold office on different terms than those he
had previously accepted.44
POLICE POWER

Zoning: Owners of certain land in Davidson County, situated in an
estate's "B" area, and a private club, as optionee to purchase the land,
on the ground that both writs were appropriate. The common-law equivalent
would lie since it was claimed that the clerk had acted illegally, and the
statutory writ would He since neither an appeal nor a writ of error was
available. 310 S.W.2d at 207-08.

38. It was claimed that TENNr. CODE ANN. § 27-501 (1956) was applicable,
allowing an appeal from the judgment of a municipal officer "charged with
the conduct of trials." The latter phrase was held to render this section
inapplicable in the instant case. 310 S.W.2d at 205-06.
39. The clerk was making a judicial determination-the legal sufficiency
of the petitions-and the writ of certiorari lies to correct or superintend inferior jurisdictions. Mandamus may be used to require the clerk to perform
the duties of office, but certiorari is also appropriate. 310 S.W.2d at 205. See
also 4 McQuiLLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRP'oRATONS § 12.251 at 317-18 (3d ed. 1949).
40. 4 McQuiLLAN, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.251 at 311 (3d ed. 1949).

41.
42.
43.
44.

See State ex rel. Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916).
Roberts v. Brown, 310 S.W.2d 197, 210 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
TiN. CONST. art. 11, § 9, as amended (1953).
Roberts v. Brown, 310 S.W.2d 197, 212 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
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applied for and were granted a permit to operate a private club on
the land. The action of the Board of Zoning Appeals was appealed,
primarily on the ground that the private club was not a legal entity
at the time the permit was issued. Although the documents required
for incorporation had been prepared and filed with the board, they
had not been filed in the offices of the Secretary of State and the
Davidson County Registrar. The court held that the permit was properly issued.45 In the first place, the board had not erroneously assumed
that the club was in legal existence at the time of the hearing. Secondly, the lack of a corporate entity did not divest the board of authority to issue the permit.4 6 Private clubs, a permissible use in an estate's
"B" area under the appropriate zoning regulations, could be operated
by an individual, unincorporated association or corporation. The
permit, moreover, is not personal to the owners of the land; instead, it
is a condition running with the land. As to the contention that the
charter and by-laws of the private club might be at variance with
those contemplated by the board, the court found no such variance,
and concluded that even if a material variance were shown, the.proper
remedy is a further hearing before the board. 47 Finally, the' court
found that there was "material evidence" to support the findings of
the board, and that those findings were, therefore, conclusive.
In Hassler v. Overton County48 certain landowners who had previously executed right-of-way contracts brought suit to recover damages to their land as a result of the construction of the highway. The
circuit court sustained the county's demurrer on the ground that the
contract precluded recovery. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the landowners were
entitled to prove on the trial of the cause that the elements of damages complained of were not within the contemplation of the parties
at the time the contract was executed. A similar case in which the
doctrine of estoppel had been applied was distinguished because the
county had acquired the land in question there by a warranty deed
which covered any and all damages which might result from the
construction work.49 The contract here was very general in nature
and did not exclude the county from liability for damages over and
45. Hickerson v. Flannery, 302 S.W.2d 508 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
46. The necessary incorporation procedure was completed by the time the
chancellor considered the case; therefore, the opponents of the permit "Would
not be aggrieved by the ruling of the Zoning Board ... " Hickerson v. Flannery, 302 S.W.2d at 514 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).

47. Since the court had already concluded that the conditions of the permit
ran with the land, it would seem that these conditions would take precedence
over any charter or by-law provision and would be a part of the rules and
regulations under which the club was operated.
48. 311 S.W.2d 206 (Tenn. 1958).
49. Denny v. Wilson County, 198 Tenn. 677, 281 S.W.2d 671 (1955).
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above the incidental benefits which constituted the quid pro quo.
Ordinances:A city ordinance requiring the licensing of motor vehicles using the city streets was upheld against the contention that it
was a revenue, not a regulatory, measure in City of Chattanooga v.
Veatch.50 The ordinance expressly required that the income from the
license fee be used in the administration and enforcement of the ordinance and to promote traffic safety. The fact that the income exceeded
the expenses of administration of the ordinance was not, according
5
to the court, a valid objection. '
A recently enacted Chattanooga ordinance, requiring certain types
of retail stores to close on Sundays, was alleged to be unconstitutional
on the ground that it was arbitrary and discriminatory, in that it
allowed similar retail stores to remain open and sell the same type
of merchandise. The supreme court, per Justice Burnett, sustained
the validity of the ordinance, finding a reasonable classification and
no discrimination between persons or retail mercantile establishments
in substantially the same situation. 52 A lack of clarity and logical
analysis and overconcern with the boundaries of judicial and legislative functions casts considerable doubt on the authoritativeness of
this opinion.
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES-ANNEXATION

In Brent v. Town of Greeneville,5 3 the supreme court decided a
matter of procedure which may well trap the unsuspecting attorney
seeking to contest annexation. The section of the Code which allows
a person taking a voluntary nonsuit one year within which to commence a new action" was held inapplicable to annexation contests.
The provision for quo warranto proceedings to contest an annexation
ordinance requires that the proceeding be brought prior to the operative date of the ordinance, 55 which is thirty days after its passage. 56
The court reasoned that this was a "built-in" statute of limitations, a
condition precedent to bringing the action, and that the one-year
extension upon the taking of a voluntary non-suit is applicable only
to general statutes of limitations relating solely to the remedy.
A description of the territory proposed to be annexed, which must
be published prior to an election on the proposed annexation,5 7 is
50. 304 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1957).
51. Id. at 327.

52. Kirk v. Olgiati, 308 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1957). The court also held that
the ordinance did not conflict with a state "Blue Law," since it did not go
beyond the terms of that statute. TENN. CODE ANN.
53. 309 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1957).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-106 (1956).
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-310 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-311 (Cum. Supp. 1958).

§

39-4001 (1956).
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sufficient if it would pass property under a deed.58 If the boundaries
of the property described can be ascertained by running the calls in
reverse, the description is sufficient even though one of the calls is
erroneous. Moreover, publishing a correct plat with the description
cured the defect. The court based its reasoning on the fact that the
purpose of publishing the description was to notify the residents of
the territory to be annexed of the proposed annexation. 59
Tennessee law requires the adjustment of the assets and liabilities of
an annexed territory as between the annexing municipality and "any
affected instrumentality of the State of Tennessee, such as, but not
limited to, a utility district, sanitary district, school district, or other
public service district ....,,60
In Hamilton County v. City of Chattanooga 6' the supreme court rejected the contention that a county was
not an "affected instrumentality of the State of Tennessee." The rule
of ejusdem generis was not applicable and did not limit this phrase to
public service districts, since the general words preceded rather than
followed the specific words. Moreover, the phrase, "but not limited
to," required, according to the court, a decision that "affected instrumentalities" was not limited to the examples given.
LABOR RELATIONS
During the survey period the right of a labor union to coerce, by
strikes and picketing, a municipal corporation to recognize it as bargaining agent for the municipal employees was before the appellate
courts in two cases.6 In both cases the question was decided adversely
to the union, although the municipal corporation was performing a
proprietary function-operating a public electric system. In both, the
municipal corporation sought and was granted an injunction against
the union.
Both of these cases are authority for the proposition that striking
and picketing a municipal corporation is illegal and against public
policy, and even though peaceful, can be enjoined by the state courts.
Moreover, this is true without regard to the nature of the function
b6ing performed by the municipal corporation-that is, whether it is
acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity is immaterial. The
controlling fact is that the functions are public in nature. In one of
58. Johnson City v. State ex rel. Maden, 304 S.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Tenn.
1957).
59. Id. at 319.
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-318 (Cum. Supp. 1958). This legislation is based

on Mendelson, Suggestions for the Improvement of Municipal Annexation

Law, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1954).
61. 310 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1958).
62. City of Alcoa v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1957);
Weakley County Municipal Elec. System v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1957). See Sanders, Labor Law-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VA~N. L.
REV. 1287 (1958).
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these cases, the principal ground for holding that such strikes are
illegal was the lack of authority in the municipal corporation to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement, 63 while in the other case, the
court relied upon the duty of a government employee to perform his
functions economically and efficiently and upon the general rule
against delegation of the discretionary duties of governmental
agencies. 64
One case presented the question of whether the doctrine of preemption divested the state courts of jurisdiction, the union contending
that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction.6 5
The court rejected this contention, noting that the National Labor
Relations Act expressly excluded governmental agencies in its definition of "employer."''
HomE RuLE
The Tennessee Constitution, by virtue of the so-called home rule
amendment adopted in 1953, provides that local legislation shall be
void unless approval by two-thirds of the local legislative body or by
a majority of the local electorate is required by the provisions of the
legislation.6 7 During the survey period the supreme court had occasion
to interpret this amendment twice.
In State ex rel. Doyle v. Torrence68 the legislature had provided for
a pension for the city judge, the act to become effective upon approval
of two-thirds of the local legislative body.69 At the meeting of the
local city council, a quorum was present, but nine members refrained
from voting, the result being that eight votes were cast in favor of
the act, two against. Two-thirds of the full membership of the body
would be fourteen. The city judge claimed that since a quorum was
present, the two-thirds required was not two-thirds of the full membership, but merely two-thirds of those present and voting. The court
rejected this contention, holding that the legislation must be approved
by two-thirds of the full membership of the local legislative body.
The other case involved the question of whether a sanitary district
was a municipality within the meaning of the home rule amendment.70
The legislature had passed local legislation extending the services of
a sanitary district, and had included in the legislation a section requiring approval by a majority of the local electorate.7 1 It was claimed
63. Weakley County Municipal Elec. System v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn.

App. W.S. 1957).
64. City of Alcoa v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1957).

65. Ibid.
66. As amended 61 Stat. 137 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952).
67. TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9.
68. 310 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 1958).
69. Tenn. Priv. Acts (1957), c. 200.
70. Fountain City Sanitary Dist. v. Knox County Election Comm'n, 308
S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1957).
71. Tenn. Priv. Acts (1957), c. 320.
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that the district was not a municipality within the meaning of the
amendment, and that the section requiring approval by the local electorate was, therefore, an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. The court sustained the contention that the sanitary district was not a municipality within the meaning of the amendment,
but held that the section requiring approval by the local electorate was
not essential to the purpose of the legislation and could be elided.
Therefore, the act was declared constitutional, the repugnant section
being elided from the legislation.
MISCELLANEOUS

Dedication of Real Estate: Although dedication of real estate to a
public use is normally a matter considered in the survey article on
real property, one case involving dedication must at least be noted
7
here, as it involves dedication by a county to a municipality.2 Rutherford County on various occasions had expressly dedicated portions of
its courthouse yard to the City of Murfreesboro to be used as streets,
but no such express dedication was made with regard to a certain
portion of the courthouse yard within the sidewalk. However, parking
on this portion of the yard had been allowed. The city had placed
parking meters around this portion of the yard, claiming it had been
dedicated as a street and that the city had exclusive control over the
streets within its boundaries. The court held that there had been no
dedication, either express or implied, in this case, relying on a number
of grounds. One ground emphasized the usual rule that there must
be a definite and certain intention to dedicate the property, the court
finding no proof of such intent on the part of the county. But most
important from the standpoint of local government law is the fact
that the court seems to hold that dedication cannot be implied when
the county or other local governmental body is the owner of the property. According to the court, the disposition of county property is
exclusively the province of the Quarterly County Court, and that body
cannot delegate this authority, since it is not a ministerial act but an
exercise of corporate powers. Therefore, the court concluded, acquiescence by county officials to a particular use of property would not
be sufficient to result in dedication.73 The court noted further that
in order to change the particular use of real property held by a municipal or public corporation, the governing body must strictly conform
to the legal procedure established by law.
Intergovernmental Relations: In another action brought by Rutherford County against the City of Murfreesboro, the county sought to
72. Rutherford County v. City of Murfreesboro, 309 S.W.2d 778 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1957).
73. Id. at 785, 786.
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recover the amount transferred from the municipal electric system
funds to the general funds of the city as a "county tax equivalent."7 4
This county tax equivalent was allowed by a provision of the contract
between the municipality and the Tennessee Valley Authority,
whereby all electric system funds were to be kept separately from the
general funds of the city, except that the city could collect from the
electric system funds the equivalent of municipal, county and state
taxes. This exception to the maintenance of separate funds was not
to be effective if taxes were actually assessed by the other governmental units. The county contended, first, that it was a third party
beneficiary of the contract, and, second, that the county tax equivalent
funds were impressed with a constructive trust for the benefit of the
county. Both contentions were rejected by the court. With regard to
the third party beneficiary theory, the court found no express provision indicating an intent to confer a benefit on the county; instead,
the only provision which would lend any weight to the argument was
the one in which the amount transferred to the city's general funds
,was declared to include the equivalent of county taxes. This was
construed merely as a yardstick to determine the amount the city
could receive for its general funds.7 5 The constructive trust theory
failed because municipal property was exempt from taxation and
the city was.under no obligation to collect county taxes on property
exempt from taxation for the benefit of the county. In short, the
county never had a legal or equitable right to the funds.
Elections: In City of Red Bank-White Oak v. Abercrombie76 the
supreme court held that the municipality and not the county must
bear the burden of a municipal referendum. In the absence of specific
legislation to the contrary, the county will be held liable for the costs
of a municipal election only if "there should appear some basis which
bears a reasonable relation to county purposes. ' '77 Section 2-1107 of
the Code,7 8 requiring county payment of the costs of elections, was
held to apply only to general elections, and not to prohibit municipali79
ties from paying the costs of special elections.
The question presented in Brown v. Vaughn8° involved the definition
of an election contest and the court which has original jurisdiction
over such a contest. An election contest was defined as "a controversy
74. Rutherford County v. City of Murfreesboro, 304 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1957).
75. The court noted in this regard that the contract specifically provided

that the tax equivalents were to be used for municipal purposes; payment to
the county would not be, the court concluded, for a municipal purpose. Id.
at 638.
76. 308 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1957).
77. Id. at 470.
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1107 (1956).
79. 308 S.W.2d at 471.

80. 310 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1957).
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between two private individuals as to the right to exercise the functions and enjoy the emoluments of an office." 81 With regard to the
original jurisdiction over such a contest, the court reiterated the rule
that the court having the power to induct the officer into office has
original jurisdiction over a contest involving that office, or in the
absence of specific legislation providing for such a contest or of specific
authority on the part of a court to induct the officer into office, the
circuit court would have jurisdiction.82 Applying this rule to the
instant case, the court found that the county court had the authority
to induct the county school superintendent into office and that it had
8
original jurisdiction over the election contest. 3
Pensions: Several cases decided during the survey period involved
the definition of terms in pension plans for public employees. In Pless
v. Franks8A the pension plan 85 provided for twenty-five per cent of the
pensioner's "basic salary" at the time of retirement for the first ten
years of service, and two and one-half per cent of the basic salary for
each year thereafter. In another provision, however, it was provided
that the full amount of the pension should not be less than fifty per
cent of the basic salary, provided that the maximum amount of the
pension was to be $150.00 per month. In the section providing for the
computation of the employee's deduction, the maximum amount of
basic salary which could be used in the computation was $300.00. The
board contended that this latter provision set a maximum on the basic
salary which could be used in computing the pension. The court
rejected this contention, holding that the full amount of basic salary
at the time of retirement must be the basis of the pension, and that
"basic salary" meant "the salary that the pensioner is receiving at the
time he retires without taking into consideration any extra compensation to which he might be entitled for extra work. '86 The legislature
intended to fix a maximum basic salary on which the monthly employee deduction is to be computed and, in addition, a maximum
pension which may be received without regard to the basic salary.
Whether the pensioner was entitled to receive credit for his service
as assistant district attorney general under a pension plan giving such
credit to former employees of the City of Memphis and Shelby County
was the issue in another pension case decided during the survey period.87 The district consisted solely of Shelby County, which paid onehalf of the assistant district attorney general's salary. The court held
81. Id. at 447.
82. Id. at 446.

83. See TEN. CODE ANN. § 49-222 (1956); Tenn. Priv. Acts (1923), c. 606.
84. 308 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. 1957).

85. Tenn. Priv. Acts (1949), c. 165, as amended, 'Tenn. Priv. Acts (1953),
c. 90.
86. 308 S.W.2d at 403.
87. Pharr v. Pension Board, 305 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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that the credit should be allowed. In the first place, the pensioner, in
performing the duties of assistant district attorney general, was being
paid by and rendering service to the county; the fact that the state
was paying half of his salary did not mean that he was not an employee
of the county. In the second place, the court indicated that the pension
board was estopped from denying the pensioner credit for this service,
having issued to him various cards stating his length of service and
including the prior service in the computation thereof.88
Utility Districts:In Chandler Investment Co. v. Whitehaven Utility
89
District,
the owner of a proposed subdivision sought a declaratory
judgment as to his rights to enter into a contract with the City of
Memphis whereby the latter would furnish water in an area situated
within the territorial boundaries of the Whitehaven Utility District.
By statute, the utility district had an exclusive franchise to furnish
water within its boundaries, 90 but it required the owner in question
to advance the capital necessary to extend its services. The court held
that the district had the exclusive right to operate within its boundaries unless it were unable to furnish the services requested, and
that the fact that it required the capital advance would not be sufficient to allow the owner to contract with another utility to furnish
such services.
88. Id. at 261-63.
89. 311 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
90. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2607 (1955).

